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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE 
COMMENTS WELCOME 
October 2009 
We acknowledge the helpful comments from participants at the CESifo Economic Studies 
Conference (2009) ‘What's wrong with Macroeconomics’, in particular to Gerhard Illing, 
participants of the Macroeconomics Workshop at the University of Oxford, Martin Ellison 
and Paul Beaudry. However, all remaining errors are ours. 1 Introduction
The benchmark DSGE model is a micro-founded representative agent model with real and/or nominal
rigidities that incorporates elements of the Real Business Cycle approach and the New Keynesian paradigm,
and where monetary policy is conducted by an independent Central Bank which follows an interest rate
rule-based approach to stabilize ination (as suggested by Woodford's 'theory' of monetary policy). DSGEs
gained popularity as tools for policy discussion and analysis among academics and central banks because of
their usefulness in identifying sources of economic uctuations, and for forecasting, and predicting the eects
of policy interventions. However, the appeal of DSGEs withered during the current nancial crisis because
they failed to provide a suitable framework for the analysis of nancial (in)stability, and it became evident
that they lacked essential elements for this purpose.
On the one hand, representative agent models rule out trade between agents, and hence the possibility of
default, as so also do transversality conditions; however, a set-up that allows for the existence and modelling
of default is required, otherwise there would be no crises. Secondly, while most DSGEs abstract from nancial
frictions, a model of active heterogeneous banks with dierent portfolios is needed to allow for the existence
of an interbank market and contagious nancial crises, as well as to capture the propagation and transmission
mechanism of shocks through the nancial system. Therefore, money, banks, and interest rates must play
an essential role; nevertheless, in Woodford's framework, money and credit arise as inessential additions to
the non-monetary version of the model; the means for credit settlement are unspecied, and the nominal
interest rate is undened.
We develop a framework for nancial stability analysis by introducing liquidity, endogenous default, and
agent heterogeneity into an otherwise canonical Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model.
Thus, our model contains nancial frictions essential to nancial stability analysis, as proposed by the
Monetary General Equilibrium literature (Goodhart et.al, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009 and Tsomocos, 2003), as
well as the dynamic and stochastic structure characteristic of DSGEs, which allow for the examination of
shock dynamics and the use of actual data for parameter calibration.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, in section 3 the equilibrium of the model as
well as its properties are described. Section 4 analyses the simulation results, and nally, section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is inhabited by two (heterogeneous) households (;) and two (heterogeneous) commercial
banks ( ;). Household  is endowed with labour, purchases consumer goods from , and owns both
commercial banks. Household  is a "`yeoman farmer"', who buys labour from household , and produces
and sells consumer goods to . Both households obtain utility from the consumption of such consumer goods.
Furthermore, household  deposits his savings with bank  , who uses these resources to extend credit
in the interbank market. Bank  borrows in the interbank credit market both from bank   and the
Central Bank; and the yeoman farmer takes out corporate credit extensions from bank . Finally let
T = f0;1;2;::t   1;t;t + 1;:::g denote de time horizon of the economy.
A diagram of the economy's nominal ows are presented below.
1Figure 1: Nominal Flows of the Economy
22.1 Financial Frictions
As suggested by Tsomocos (2003) and Goodhart et. al (2006), in order to provide an appropriate framework
for nancial stability analysis, we introduce two essential nancial frictions: default and money.
Following Shubik and Wilson (1977) and Dubey et al. (2000), in our model default arises as an equilibrium
phenomenon, because agents choose what fraction to pay from their outstanding debt. However, unlike these
authors, the cost of defaulting is not given by a penalty that reduces utility; instead, we have introduced
default costs as penalties that reduce an individual's ability to borrow after he defaults on a loan.1
On the other hand, money is introduced via cash-in-advance constraints, whereby all commodities and
assets can be traded only for money, and all asset deliveries are paid in money. Moreover, money enters the
system as inside or outside money. Inside money enters the system accompanied by an osetting obligation
(money supplied by the Central Bank through Open Market Operations (OMOs) in the interbank market
and matched by individual borrowers' debt obligation to commercial banks), while outside money enters the
system free and clear of any osetting obligations (monetary endowments).
2.1.1 Outside Money
Outside money proxies any liquid injection in the economy either from the government or the international
economy. For example, if the government runs budget decits then they manifest themselves as money-
nanced scal transfers. Moreover, positive liquid wealth in the economy without any osetting obligation
anchors interest rates even in the absence of a Taylor Rule; otherwise, nominal interest rates in the absence
of default would be zero, and therefore the price level of the economy indeterminate (see Buiter (1999),
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), and Tsomocos (2008)).
Since outside money enters the system free and clear of any osetting obligations, it is accumulated in the















t  monetary endowments in period t for i = f;; ;g
And the growth rate of Gt follows and AR(1) process:
ln(gG;t) = G ln(  gG) +
 
1   G






1Therefore, default penalties aect agents' nancial constraints, not their objective functions.
3We also assume that outside money is always distributed to agents on the same 'pro-rata' basis. Therefore,
households and banks always receive the same proportion of Government transfers. Assuming bank  , bank




t = !1Gt , where !1 > 0 (4)
m
t = !2Gt , where !2 > 0 (5)
m

t = !3Gt , where !3 > 0 (6)
m
t = (1   !1   !2   !3)Gt , where 0 < !1 + !2 + !3 < 1 (7)
Finally, since outside money is constantly growing, the system needs to be made stationary; following
Schorfheide (2000) we achieve this by stationarizing the model with respect to Gt 1; i.e. we divide all the
monetary variables at time t by Gt 1; thus all equations are re-specied in terms of the money growth rate
and stationarized variables, which we denote with hats





Inside money represents the interventions of the Central Bank in the interbank market; these liquidity
injections must exit the system (with accrued interest and net of default) when borrowing commercial banks
repay their obligations. Consequently, we model inside money shocks as changes to the level of expansionary
OMOs2:
^ Mt = CB
t























and  CB = 1 at the steady state of the economy.
2.2 Household 's optimisation problem
Household  owns the banks, which have a 100 percent dividend payout ratio.  receives its previous
period deposits repayment, the banks' dividend payment, its labour income, purchases manufactured goods





































t, 8t 2 T (11)
(i.e. goods expenditures + deposits at time t  private monetary endowments
+ labour income at time t + deposits repayment + banks dividend payments)
2Since outside money is growing constantly, which requires the stationarization of all nominal variables in order to solve




t  amount of at money sent by  to purchase goods at time t
d
t  deposits made by  in bank   at time t
pt  price of consumption goods at time t
N  's time endowment
L
t  amount of time  chooses to work in period t
wt  wage rate paid per unit of time worked in period t
R
t  expected rate of delivery on deposits made in period t   1
rd
t  interest rate of return on deposits in period t

 
t  bank  's prots in period t

t  bank 's prots in period t
  discount factor
  leisure relative preference parameter
2.2.1 Behaviour of Household 
The maximisation of the objective function (10) subject to the budget constraint (11) with respect to
expenditures in the goods market (or deposits) and labour, yields the following rst-order conditions for


































, and equation (13) depicts the traditional leisure-consumption trade-o.
Note that budget constraints for  and the other agents of the economy bind, because money is at and
agents do not derive utility from holding it. Thus, individuals do not hold idle cash, instead they lend it out
to someone who needs it.
2.3 Yeoman Farmer ()'s optimisation problem
 is a "`yeoman farmer"' who hires labour from , then it manufactures goods, a fraction of which are
consumed by himself, while the rest are sold to .
 repays his previous period outstanding debt with the prots accumulated from the proceeds of last
period sales. Furthermore,  takes out a loan with bank  (net of the penalty costs from defaulting on his
previous period loan), to pay for his expenses in the labour market.




































t 1 8t 2 T with vF
0 = 

 1 = 0 (16)
i.e. corporate loan repayment at time t  private monetary endowments at time t


















t 1 8t 2 T with vF
0 = 

 1 = 0 (17)
(i.e. payroll payment at time t  corporate borrowing at time t - credit costs on
outstanding corporate debt)
















































t  production of consumption goods by  in period t
q

t  amount of goods oered for sale by  in period t


t  corporate debt acquired by  in the corporate credit market in period t
vF
t  's repayment rate on his outstanding debt in the corporate credit market in period t
rF
t  interest rate on corporate loans extended in period t
b

L;t  amount of at money sent by  to hire labour at time t
At  technological factor in period t, it's a stationary AR(1) process
m

t  's monetary endowments in period t


t  default penalty on corporate credit outstanding debt in period t
  returns to scale parameter
2.3.1 Behaviour of Yeoman Farmer 
The maximisation of the objective function (14) subject to budget constraints (16) and (17) with respect
to expenditure in the labour market and good sales, yields respectively the following rst-order conditions:
gG;tU0 (c
































Equation (20) extends the usual Euler equation for a liquidity constrained agent by taking into account







On the other hand, equation (21) represents the trade-o between buying and selling dierent goods; it
states that in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between purchased and sold goods has to equal






62.4 Bank  's optimisation problem
Bank   is risk averse. It maximizes a concave function of its net end-of-period cash ows, which are
given by the repayment of last period interbank loans less the bank's repayment of household 0s last period
deposits. Moreover, the bank takes deposits from households (less the default penalty), and makes credit






























t 1 8t 2 T with vd
0 = d
 1 = dIB

















t 1 8t 2 T with vd
0 = d
 1 = dIB
 1 = 0 (24)
(i.e. interbank credit extensions at time t  monetary endowments + household deposits - credit
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t  bank  's monetary endowment at the beginning of period t
d
t  debt that bank   acquires with household  in period t
RIB
t  expected rate of delivery on interbank loans extended in period t   1
rIB
t  interest rate on interbank loans extended in period t
dIB
t  deposits made by bank   in the interbank market in period t
vIB
t   's re-payment rate on its outstanding debt in the interbank market in period t

 
t  default penalty on deposits in period t
^   banks' discount factor
2.4.1 Behaviour of bank  
The maximisation of the objective function (22) subject to budget constraints (23) and (24) with respect to















































7Equation (26) implies that in equilibrium, banks trade-o the benets of additional future prots due
to lower borrowing in the current period after taking account of interest and credit costs savings, with the
costs of defaulting less on their current outstanding debt obligations with households. Note that in order to
maintain its desired level of credit extension in the interbank market in the present, if bank   borrows less
from households, it must lower its credit costs by repaying a higher fraction on deposits, and thus lowering
its prots, at that period.
Similarly, equation (27) implies that banks trade-o the benets of additional future prots due to larger
credit extensions in the interbank market in the present (taking account of accrued interest and default),
with the costs the bank has to bear in order to make that additional credit extension; namely, the cost of
higher borrowing (which entails a marginal increase of credit costs by 
 
t+1), and/or the cost of repaying a
higher fraction of outstanding obligations today.
2.5 Bank 's optimisation problem
Bank  is risk averse. It maximizes a concave function of its net end-of-period cash ows, which are
given by the repayment of last period corporate loans less the bank's repayment of its interbank last period
outstanding debt. Moreover, the bank makes corporate credit extensions with the loan it takes out in the



























t 1 8t 2 T with vIB
0 = IB
 1 = dF















t 1 8t 2 T with vIB
0 = IB
 1 = dF
 1 = 0 (30)
(i.e. corporate credit extensions at time t  monetary endowments + interbank borrowing - credit
























t  bank 's monetary endowment at the beginning of period t
IB
t  debt that bank  acquires in the interbank market in period t
RF
t  expected rate of delivery on corporate loans extended in period t   1
rF
t  interest rate on corporate loans extended in period t
dF
t  deposits made by bank  in the corporate credit market in period t
vF
t  's re-payment rate on its outstanding debt in the corporate credit market in period t

 
t  default penalty on deposits in period t
2.5.1 Behaviour of bank 
The maximisation of the objective function (28) subject to budget constraints (29) and (30) with respect





































These equations can be interpreted similarly to the First Order Conditions of bank  , equations (26) and
(27).
2.6 Market clearing conditions
There are 5 markets in the economy: the goods, labour, consumer deposit, interbank, and corporate credit
markets. In each of these markets the price equating demand and supply is determined.
Goods market. In every period, the goods market clears when the amount of money oered for goods is
exchanged for the quantity of goods oered for sale. Thus, 8t 2 T, whenever b










Labour market. In every period, the labour market clears when labour expenditures by  are exchanged
for the amount of hours that household  is willing to work. Thus, 8t 2 T, whenever b










Deposit market. The consumer deposit market clears when the amount of money the commercial bank  
oers to repay in the next period is exchanged for the amount of money  deposits in the current period.
Thus, 8t 2 T, whenever d









Interbank market. The interbank market clears when the amount of money commercial bank  promises
to repay in the next period is exchanged for the credit extension commercial bank   and the Central Bank
oer in the current period. Thus, 8t 2 T, whenever IB
t > 0 and dIB






t + ^ Mt
(37)
Corporate credit market. The corporate credit market clears when the amount of yeoman farmer  oers
to repay in the next period is exchanged for the credit extension commercial bank  oers in the current
period. Thus, 8t 2 T, whenever 












Rational expectations conditions imply that households and commercial banks are correct in their expec-
tations about the fraction of loans that will be repaid to them.
Bank 's expected rate of corporate loan delivery is given by
3In this setting, the Central Bank can control either rIB
t or Mt, but Goodhart et. al. (2008) show that the optimal monetary
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8t 2 T (39)
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8t 2 T (40)
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B () = f : (6)   (7)holdg
B  () =











is a monetary short run equilibrium with commercial banks, money, and default
i:
1. All agents optimize given their budget sets.




, for h 2 H = f;g, t 2 T






, for j 2 J = f ;g, t 2 T
Where h
t is the vector of quantities of goods and leisure consumed by agent h at time t 2 T, Uh (:) is
his utility function over consumption streams of goods and leisure, and (:) is the utility function of
commercial banks over their prots.
2. All markets clear. Hence, equations (16)   (20) hold.
3. Expectations are rational. Thus, conditions (21)   (23) are satised.
3.2 Long Run Equilibrium (Steady State) Denition
In the steady state, in addition to the conditions required to obtain a Short Run Equilibrium:
1. All real and nominal (stationarised) variables do not grow, such that




2. The economy is not subject to any current or expected shocks, such that





3.3 Characterisation of the Equilibrium
Put dierently, our view is consistent with the long run money non-neutrality proposition as the Real
Business Cycle (RBC) as well as the New Keynesian literature suggests. However, our model obtains money
non-neutrality in the short-run unlike the RBC models where neutrality always holds. Furthermore, in
stark dierence with the New Keynesian approach where short run non-neutrality obtains only through real
frictions such as monopolistic competition and asymmetric information, in our framework non-neutrality is
driven by our postulated transaction technology and its subsequent transactions and investment demand for
money. In other words, liquidity and default are arguably the driving forces of our results.
Steady State At the deterministic steady state, all real and nominal (stationarised) variables do not grow,
outside money growth rate is constant, and the Central Bank does not change its monetary policy stance.
The steady state of the model is obtained after imposing these conditions on the short run equilibrium
solution. See the Appendix 1.
Proposition 3.1 At any short run equilibrium, rd
t;rIB
t  0, and rIB
t  rd
t 8t 2 T.


















Proposition 3.2 At any short run equilibrium, rIB
t ;rF
t  0, and rF
t  rIB
t 8t 2 T.


















11Proposition 3.3 To preclude arbitrage opportunities in the steady state, vd  vIB  vF , rd  rIB  rF.
Proof The results follow immediately from the long run solution of the model and the conditions which
ensure that agents do not repay more than what they owe, or that they are not rewarded for defaulting on
their obligations (these are equivalent to the transversality conditions); in other words, agents are allowed to
default partially. Consequently, endogenous default is compatible with the orderly functioning of the market
economy.
    1 ! vd =     1
      ! vIB =
 
    1
     ! vF =
 
   1
Proposition 3.4 In the steady state, higher default penalties induce lower interest rates: the Default Penalty
(Regulatory) Accelerator Principle
















Proposition 3.5 If rF
t > 0 for t 2 T, then monetary and regulatory policy is non-neutral in the short run.
Proof Monetary and regulatory shocks, which aect the corporate credit rate, are non-neutral; otherwise,


























Proposition 3.6 Fisher Eect: Nominal interest rates are approximately equal to real interest rates plus
expected ination and a risk premium.
Proof Suppose b
t > 0 8t 2 T and that  has money left over when the consumer deposit market meets at
















































L;t > 0 8t 2 T, and that  has money left over when the corporate loan comes due at t,















































12Hereafter, we analyse a parameterized version of the model. Table 1 of Appendix 1 contains the chosen
parameter values.4 Furthermore, steady state values for interest and repayment rates are calculated following
propositions 3.1 and 3.2, whilst the steady state solution for the rest of the endogenous variables is obtained
numerically (See Table 2 of Appendix 1).
4 Simulations
The purpose of this section is to describe how the endogenous variables of the model respond to several
shocks, and to assess the impact of introducing agent heterogeneity, liquidity and default into a DSGE model.
Therefore, we analyze the eects of shocks to the ratio of outside to inside money (monetary policy shock),
the outside money growth rate (money-nanced scal transfers or IS curve shock), and productivity in three
dierent models. We also evaluate the impact of regulatory policy; however, these shocks have non-trivial
eects only in the presence of default frictions.
The rst model is a standard (representative agent) New Keynesian framework, which is described by
three key equations; an aggregate demand equation (IS curve) whereby aggregate demand is related to future
and/or lagged output and real interest rates (or real money balances); a Phillips Curve, which is derived
from the optimization of price setting monopolistic rms, thereby relating ination with current output and
ination expectations; and a monetary policy or Taylor rule; however, to compare the simulations of our
model with the New Keynesian framework, we replace the Central Bank's reaction function with a stochastic
process for the stock of money (see the New Keynesian Model section in the Appendix 1).
Using our framework, we derive the second and third models. First, we allow the model to overcome only
two of the limitations of the New Keynesian framework by incorporating liquidity and agent heterogeneity
(Monetary General Equilibrium Model without Default, MGE). In the third model we further relax the
assumption of no default.5 The upshot of this framework is that the comprehensive analysis of monetary
and nancial stability policy depends crucially on the interplay of endogenous default, liquidity, heterogeneity,
and more importantly, a non-trivial and active banking sector. It is the combination of these elements what
allows for a systematic analysis of the short-run eects of exogenous shocks in capital markets and their
consequent impact on the real economy.
The New Keynesian model does not include nancial frictions, which implies that the interest rate is
not determined in the money market. On the other hand, although the MGE model incorporates agent
heterogeneity and liquidity, in absence of default, no arbitrage requires interest rates to be equal across all
markets; thus net lending is constant, and prots in the banking sector are aected only by the interest rate.
4.1 Inside Money Shock
4.1.1 Monetary Policy Shock in the New Keynesian Model
An exogenous increase in the stock of money raises real money balances, and thus aggregate demand. A
positive output gap inates prices, thereby lowering real money balances, and hence demand. This implies
that monetary policy is neutral in the long run, whereas in the short run sluggishly adjusting prices explain
4Note that this set of parameters was not obtained through a calibration exercise. We will calibrate the model in a future
version of this paper.
5Previously, there have been attempts to include nancial frictions in DSGE models, but none of them has successfully
included all the elements that are essential to the analysis of nancial stability, namely liquidity, default and agent heterogeneity.
Leao and Leao (2007), include default but they ignore liquidity and agent heterogeneity, de Walque et. al (2008) include default
and heterogeneity in the banking sector but they treat money as a veil, Iacoviello and Neri (2007) and Notarpietro (2007), have
agent heterogeneity and a banking sector, but they do not incorporate default risk or liquidity, nor do they allow the banking
sector to play an active role in the economy.
13the real eects of monetary policy as well as the gradual stabilization of output and ination (See Figure 2
in Appendix 3).
4.1.2 Monetary Policy Shock in a Monetary General Equilibrium Model without Default
In the monetary model without default, a monetary policy shock (an increase in the ratio of inside to
outside money) lowers the interbank rate, which induces bank  to borrow more from bank  . To preclude
arbitrage opportunities, the borrowing bank makes a larger credit extension in the corporate credit market,
thereby reducing its interest rate until it reaches the interbank rate level.
Easier credit conditions allow the yeoman farmer  to spend more in the labour market, which raises
employment as well as wages. Consequently, higher labour income induces household  to spend more in the
goods market and to make larger deposits, which increases trade and goods prices. Bank   takes as many
deposits from the household as required to lower the deposit rate to its non-arbitrage level.
Protability in the banking sector drops due to the fall in interest rates, and welfare does not improve
because trade increases more than output, thereby leaving the yeoman farmer  with a lower level of con-
sumption. Finally as the monetary policy shock disappears, variables start reverting gradually to their
steady state levels (see Figure 4 in Appendix 3).
4.1.3 Monetary Policy Shock in a the presence of Liquidity, Agent Heterogeneity and Default
An increase in the inside to outside money ratio reduces the interbank rate. Lower funding costs for bank
 allow him to make larger corporate credit extensions, thereby reducing the interest rate on corporate loans.
This implies that yeoman farmer  can fund more spending in the labour market, which increases wages as
well as the level of employment and output. Finally, as labour income increases, household  spends more in
the goods market and makes larger deposits with bank ; this raises trade and prices and lowers the deposit
rate.
As interest rates decrease, the relative cost of default falls; therefore, repayment rates drop across all
credit markets except for the corporate credit market, where higher sales revenues induce  to repay a larger
fraction of his outstanding corporate debt. Nevertheless, commercial banks prots rise because the negative
eect of increased default is oset by the widening of credit spreads and higher lending.
In the period after the shock, higher goods sales revenues and wider credit spreads induce yeoman farmer
 and bank  to make larger repayments on their corporate and interbank obligations respectively. This is
not the case for the deposit market, where due to the Central Bank's intervention, the volume of interbank
lending relative to deposits decreases, thereby forcing bank   to default more.
Higher default in the deposit market increases the deposit rate next period; this limits  's lending capacity
in the interbank market which raises its interest rate. Tighter credit conditions for bank , induce it make
fewer credit extensions in the corporate credit market, thus increasing the corporate rate as well.
Consequently, the yeoman farmer  is forced to spend less in the labour market, thereby reducing employ-
ment and wages. This lowers household 's labour income, which induces him to spend less in the goods
market and to make fewer deposits; thus, 's revenues decrease and the deposit rate rises. As credit costs
increase, default recovers in the interbank and deposit markets, whereas falling sales revenues induce  to
gradually reduce the repayment rate on his corporate debt.
14As the monetary policy shock winds down, the stabilization process described in the previous two para-
graphs helps the economy revert to its steady state level at a faster pace than in the absence of default (see
Figures 5 and 6 in Appendix 3).
4.1.4 Remarks
In the presence of default, as aggregate repayment rates drop initially, interest rates start rising faster than
in the MGE model; this explains why variables oscillate around the steady state as the eects of the shock
disappear, as well as the fact that the economy undergoes a recession and becomes nancially unstable6 a
few periods after the shock. These medium term eects are overlooked by models that exclude nancial
frictions, especially default risk.
4.2 Outside Money Shock
4.2.1 Fiscal Policy (IS Curve) Shock in the New Keynesian Model
In the New Keynesian model, a scal expansion increases aggregate demand and therefore makes the
output gap positive. Therefore, prices start to rise sluggishly, which lowers real money balances and the
output gap. As the eects of the aggregate demand shock vanishes, output and prices return to their steady
state levels; however, the economy undergoes a recession in the medium term because prices remain high for
a few periods after the shock has disappeared completely (see Figure 7 in Appendix 3).
4.2.2 Fiscal Policy Shock in a Monetary General Equilibrium Model without Default
An exogenous increase in the growth rate of outside money raises the capacity of agents to make interest
payments, thereby stimulating the demand for credit. Accordingly, to preclude arbitrage opportunities
creditors make larger credit extensions to the extent that induces interest rates to rise equally .
On the other hand, larger monetary endowments provide incentives to the yeoman farmer to sell fewer
goods because he requires fewer revenues to meet his desired level of spending in the labour market. There-
fore, goods prices increase, which induces household  to spend less in the goods market. Consequently,
yeoman farmer  cuts production and demands less labour, which reduces wages. Higher prices and lower
labour income force household  to make fewer deposits with bank   in order to smooth consumption.
This increases the deposit rate, and hence forces banks to make fewer credit extensions, thereby raising
interbank and corporate credit rates until they reach their non-arbitrage levels. After the rst period, since
interest rates remain high, credit and spending keep falling, which reduces prices; nevertheless, this does not
stimulate spending in the goods and labour markets because the eect of tighter credit conditions dominates.
Prots in the banking sector increase due to higher interest rates, while welfare does not improve because
lower trade has a signicant negative impact on 's consumption.
Finally, when the eects of the shock disappear, interest rates start to drop gradually, thereby stimulating
credit, spending, and employment, which raise prices and wages. Thereafter, all variables return slowly to
their steady state levels (see Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix 3).
6Hereafter, we will use the Goodhart-Tsomocos (2006) measure Financial Stability. According to these authors, an economy
is nancially unstable whenever substantial default of a `number' of households and banks occurs, and the aggregate protability
of the banking sector decreases signicantly.
154.2.3 Fiscal Policy Shock in a the presence of Liquidity, Agent Heterogeneity and Default
The eects of an increase in the growth rate of outside money are qualitatively similar to those of the MGE
model. As the capacity of agents to make interest payments increases, demand for credit and interest rates
rise. Also, the yeoman farmer has incentives to sell fewer goods, which increases goods prices and induces
household  to spend less in the goods market. This lowers demand for labour, and hence wages. Higher
prices and lower labour income force household  to make fewer deposits with bank  , thereby increasing
the deposit rate as well.
Nevertheless, interest rates increase more than in the MGE model because growth of money-nanced scal
transfers allow agents to aord larger credit costs, and thus to default more. Higher interest rates reduce
demand for credit in the following period, and thus spending and employment decrease.
Lower repayment rates exacerbate the eects of scal policy on interest rates (relative to the default-free
case); therefore, before the scal shock disappears, interest rates start to fall because credit costs reach a
very high level, which induces agents to repay a larger fraction of their outstanding obligations.
When the eects of the shock vanish, repayment rates, trade and spending continue growing until once
again credit costs reach a level that induces agents to default more. Afterwards, all variables move gradually
towards their steady state level (see Figures 10 in Appendix 3).
4.2.4 Remarks
In the New Keynesian model a scal expansion increases output because the model relies on the assumption
that aggregate demand is equal to consumption demand. In contrast, the models with monetary frictions
and heterogeneous agents suggest that expansionary scal policy reduces output via a crowding-out eect
(in line with the IS-LM model predictions); therefore, the producer's welfare improves at the expense of the
household.
Moreover, the behaviour of default rates and their impact on interest rates, explains why the eects of
scal policy are more pronounced than in the default-free frameworks, as well as why variables oscillate
around their steady state levels when the eects of the shock start to disappear.
Finally, our model predicts that expansionary scal policy induces a deep recession in the short run, and
that the economy becomes nancially unstable in the short to medium run because aggregate default remains
high and protability in the banking sector starts to fall. These eects are not depicted by the models that
exclude default frictions.
4.3 Productivity Shock
4.3.1 Productivity Shock in the New Keynesian Model
In the New Keynesian framework, a positive productivity shock reduces prices, which increases real bal-
ances and hence aggregate demand; however, a positive output gap increases the level of prices and ination,
thereby lowering real money balances and income. Since prices adjust sluggishly this stabilization process
is smooth; thus as the eects of the productivity shock disappear, prices and output revert to their steady
state levels gradually (See Figure 11 in Appendix 3).
4.3.2 Productivity Shock in a Monetary General Equilibrium Model without Default
A positive productivity shock increases the technological factor of production, At; hence yeoman farmer 
produces more goods with the same amount labour. A higher supply of goods reduces prices, thus increasing
16trade by a smaller amount than output and raising consumption of both,  and . Although, lower prices
increase real wages, household  does not change his supply of labour because he has a separable logarithmic
utility function, which implies that in the absence of default, income and substitution eects oset each
other. As the eects of the shock start to wind down, trade and prices return gradually to their steady state
levels (see Figure 12 of the Appendix 3).
4.3.3 Productivity Shock in a the presence of Liquidity, Agent Heterogeneity and Default
A positive productivity shock increases the technological factor of production, At, which implies that the
yeoman farmer can produce more goods with the same or fewer hours of work. As in the previous model, 
supplies more goods, which drives prices down and increases consumption of both agents.
Lower prices reduce 's revenues, thereby inducing the yeoman farmer to repay a lower fraction of his
outstanding debt, and consequently lowering bank 's prots. Higher default in the corporate credit market
raises 's credit costs, thus forcing him to borrow more in order to satisfy his desired level of spending in
the labour market. Higher demand for loans in the corporate credit market provide incentives to bank  to
borrow more and to repay a higher rate on its interbank debt. This lowers the interbank rate as well as 's
credit costs.
Similarly, to meet its increased demand for interbank credit, bank   takes more deposits from household
 and makes higher repayments. Consequently, and in stark contrast to the MGE model, household  works
more in order to satisfy the increased demand for deposits, but he distributes his additional labour income
between deposits and goods expenditures to prevent the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) of leisure over
consumption to fall below its optimal level.
Thus, the supply of deposits becomes relatively `scarce', which increases the deposit rate. On the other
hand, the corporate credit interest rate falls because a lower interbank rate eases credit conditions for bank
, thereby allowing it to make larger credit extensions to the yeoman farmer. This implies that aggregate
protability in the banking sector falls; bank 's prots fall because wider corporate interbank-credit spreads
cannot oset the negative eects of higher default in the corporate credit market, whereas bank  's prots
drop as the spread between interbank and deposit rates narrows.
All variables begin reverting to their steady state levels as the technological shock starts to wind down.
When prices start increasing, household  reduces its spending in the goods market and trade falls; however,
since real wages remains high,  increases his supply of labour for a few periods. Once the productivity
shock vanishes completely, as the level of employment is still high, yeoman farmer  sells fewer goods and
demands less labour in order to improve his prots. This drives prices up and wages down, thereby forcing
household  to make fewer deposits and increasing the deposit rate. Tighter nancial conditions in the
deposit market induce agents to borrow less in the interbank and corporate credit markets, thereby raising
their corresponding interest rates. Moreover, as 's revenues improve, default in corporate loans falls, which
in addition to higher interest rates, induces banks to default more on their obligations.
A positive productivity shock improves welfare of both,  and  by increasing their levels of consumption,
as explained previously. Moreover, the economy becomes nancially unstable in the short run, where prots
in the banking sector drop and default in the corporate market increases.
4.3.4 Remarks
The models that do not incorporate nancial frictions, most importantly default, overlook the eects of
productivity shocks on nominal and real variables except for prices and consumption. Moreover, our results
suggest that a model without default frictions cannot predict the negative eects of technological shocks on
nancial stability in the short run.
174.4 Tighter Regulation
In this section we assess the eects of a transitory tightening of nancial regulation in nancial markets.
Higher default penalties increase credit costs, thereby inducing the yeoman farmer and commercial banks
to repay a larger fraction of their outstanding obligations. Lower default reduces interest rates across all
markets, thereby stimulating demand for credit. This increases the level of spending in the labour market,
which raises employment and wages, and hence the levels of spending and trade in the goods markets.
Since default penalties increase in proportion to their initial level, credit costs increase more in the deposit
market, followed by the interbank market and then the corporate credit market. Thus, the demand for
deposits increases more than the demand for interbank credit, which in turn increases more than corporate
credit demand. Consequently, credit spreads narrow, thereby reducing prots in the banking sector.
The economy maintains this trend for a few periods, but as the eects of tighter regulation start to
disappear, credit costs fall below a threshold which induces agents to start repaying a lower fraction of their
outstanding obligations. Nevertheless, since aggregate default remains relatively low, lending continues to
grow, thereby maintaining interest rates low. When the eects of regulation vanish completely, the economy
converges towards its steady state as interest rates start increasing in response to higher default, and tighter
nancial conditions reduce borrowing and spending.
The small dierences between the dynamics of repayment rates are due to the fact that a proportional
increase of default penalties has larger and more persistent eects on markets that are more heavily regulated
in the steady state (the deposit market).
This policy reduces aggregate default in the short run, and promotes nancial stability in the medium
run, where aggregate default remains low and prots in the banking recover sharply.
4.4.1 Remarks
Eects of regulatory policy can only be assessed in a model that allows for default to arise as an equilibrium
outcome. Moreover, due to agent heterogeneity, the eects of regulatory policies depend on the particular
agent, or part of the economy, directly aected. This is due to the fact that the distribution of income and
welfare between agents is aected dierently (Goodhart 2004).
For this reason, we also analyze the eects of increasing the default penalty for one credit market at a time.
Our results show that the agent directly aected by the regulatory change starts to behave more prudently,
as well as the agents whose access to funding depends on the aected agent; therefore, tighter regulation in
the corporate market increases repayment rates across all credit markets, in the interbank market it reduces
default in the interbank and deposit markets only, and in the deposit market it only succeeds in raising
repayment rates in that market.
Moreover, all though trade increases as a response to stricter regulation in any of the credit markets, the
agent directly aected by the policy is worst o in the short run. For instance, higher default penalties in
the interbank market reduce bank 's prots, but the household's welfare and the protability of the other
bank improve.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a model that, by including default frictions, liquidity and agent heterogeneity overcomes
some of the limitations that the canonical DSGE has as a tool for the analysis of nancial stability. To analyze
the role of these frictions, we compared the eects of several types of shocks across three dierent models: a
18standard New Keynesian model, a model with money and heterogeneous agents but no default, and a model
that incorporates all the aforementioned frictions.
Our results suggest that agent heterogeneity is essential to assess the welfare eects of exogenous shocks,
because these depend on the part of the economy directly aected. Furthermore, unlike the New Keynesian
framework, in the models that incorporate nancial frictions such as liquidity, interest rates are determined
in the credit and money markets and the price level of the economy is determinate.
The simulations also suggest that in the absence of default frictions, interest rates in the economy are
equal to each other and the transmission mechanism of shocks, as well as their propagation is distorted.
This implies that the short to medium run (adverse) eects that demand as well as supply shocks have on
economic growth and nancial stability are not properly captured.
This model and its results are a stepping-stone of our continuing research. We have abstracted from
modelling a sophisticated production sector, as well as the reaction function of policy makers, in particular
the Central Bank. Nevertheless, our model can be used to make these extensions, but these will be presented
in future studies.
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We assume that household  derives logarithmic utility from his consumption of goods and leisure; thus
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23Numerical Example
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 1 
  0.99
 A 1 N
 1
 0.99 !1 0.25
 gG 1.03 !2 0.25
 0.7 !3 0.25

 0.94 ^ M 1

 0.97  1
Table 2: Steady State
Variable Steady State Value Variable Steady State Value
without Default in the presence of Default





 31.6417 ^ d
 9.8030
^ d
F 33.1567 ^ d
F 10.9953
^ d
IB 31.8992 ^ d
IB 9.9615




^ p 70.1185 ^ p 24.5577
^ w 67.3955 ^ w 22.1877
^ 
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The log linearized equations of the model are:
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~ yt  output gap in period t
mt  stock of money in period t
pt  aggregate price level in period t
Phillips Curve
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25Figure 2: Monetary Policy Shock in the New Keynesian Model
Figure 3: Monetary Policy Shock without Default
26Figure 4: Monetary Policy Shock without Default (cont.)
Figure 5: Monetary Policy Shock in the Presence of Default
27Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shock in the Presence of Default (cont.)
Figure 7: Fiscal Policy Shock in the New Keynesian Model
28Figure 8: Fiscal Policy Shock without Default
Figure 9: Fiscal Policy Shock without Default (cont.)
29Figure 10: Fiscal Policy Shock in the Presence of Default
30Figure 11: Technological Shock in the New Keynesian Model
Figure 12: Technological Shock without Default
31Figure 13: Technological Shock in the Presence of Default
32Figure 14: Tighter Regulatory Policy
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